![]() ![]() Here is Plantinga's explanation of why if a maximally great being exists in some possible world it exists in every possible world. This looks like a "lame terms" redux of Plantinga's "victorious" ontological argument from The Nature of Necessity. One can say that a being that lives in all worlds is greater than a being that lives in one, but why is this always true? I'm having a hard time convincing myself. ![]() Why is it that a maximally great being must exist in every possible world. I found many arguments against this argument, but I could not find anything that explained the third premise. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.It is possible that a maximally great being exists.I found the following version of the Ontological Argument online (I'm pretty certain its Plantinga's but I couldn't find an exact source). ![]()
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